Federal tax competition and the efficiency consequences for local taxation of revenue equalization by Kotsogiannis, Christos
Economics Department 
Discussion Papers Series 
ISSN 1473 – 3307 
 
FEDERAL TAX COMPETITION AND THE 
EFFICIENCY CONSEQUENCES FOR 
LOCAL TAXATION OF REVENUE 
EQUALIZATION 
 
 
Christos Kotsogiannis  
 
 
Paper number 07/01 
URL: http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/economics/papers/ 
DISCUSSION PAPERS IN ECONOMICS 
ISSN 1473 – 3307 
UNIVERSITY OF EXETER 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
FEDERAL TAX COMPETITION AND THE EFFICIENCY CONSEQUENCES 
FOR LOCAL TAXATION OF REVENUE EQUALIZATION 
Paper number 07/01 
Christos Kotsogiannis 
University of Exeter 
Department of Economics 
School of Business and Economics 
University of Exeter 
Streatham Court 
Rennes Drive, EX4 4PU 
England, UK 
E-mail: c.kotsogiannis@exeter.ac.uk 
June 2007 
Abstract 
Recent work has shown that a system of equalization grants can limit tax 
competition among lower-level governments. The structure of such models, 
however, does not allow for the federal to be an active player but its role is being 
limited in the administration of the equalization grants.  The implication of this 
is that potentially important, for the efficiency properties of lower-level 
government taxation, vertical fiscal externalities are ignored. This paper 
introduces equalization grants into a standard federal capital tax competition 
model in which fiscal externalities arise not only horizontally, between 
jurisdictions, but also vertically between the levels of government. It is shown 
that, even in the presence of vertical fiscal inefficiencies, efficiency in the level of 
lower-level government taxation can be achieved by a modifying version of a 
standard equalization grant formula. 
Keywords:  Federal tax competition; fiscal externalities; equalization grants 
JEL: H41; H71; H77 
FEDERAL TAX COMPETITION AND THE EFFICIENCY
CONSEQUENCES FOR LOCAL TAXATION OF REVENUE
EQUALIZATION
Christos Kotsogiannis
Department of Economics
School of Business and Economics
University of Exeter
Streatham Court
Rennes Drive, EX4 4PU
England, UK
E-mail: c.kotsogiannis@exeter.ac.uk
This version: June 19, 2007
Acknowledgements: This paper has benefited from comments from Ourania Karakosta,
Mick Keen, Miltiadis Makris, Leonzio Rizzo and Robert Schwager. Financial support
from the Catalan Government Science Network (Project No. SGR2005-177) is gratefully
acknowledged. The usual caveat applies.
Abstract: Recent work has shown that a system of equalization grants can limit tax
competition among lower-level governments. The structure of such models, however,
does not allow for the federal to be an active player but its role is being limited in the
administration of the equalization grants. The implication of this is that potentially
important, for the efficiency properties of lower-level government taxation, vertical fis-
cal externalities are ignored. This paper introduces equalization grants into a standard
federal capital tax competition model in which fiscal externalities arise not only hori-
zontally, between jurisdictions, but also vertically between the levels of government. It
is shown that, even in the presence of vertical fiscal inefficiencies, efficiency in the level
of lower-level government taxation can be achieved by a modifying version of a standard
equalization grant formula.
Keywords: Federal tax competition; fiscal externalities; equalization grants
JEL classification: H41; H71; H77
1
1 Introduction
Until quite recently the theory of tax competition in federal economies (meaning ones in
which there is tax-setting autonomy at more than one level of policy-decision making) has
focused on the welfare consequences of horizontal externalities arising from the mobility
of tax bases between jurisdictions.1 The central conclusion from this work has been that
horizontal externalities tend to leave equilibrium lower-level government taxes too low:
Each jurisdiction ignores the benefit it confers on other jurisdictions by raising its tax
rate and so inducing outward movement of its tax base.
More recently, attention has turned to the key feature of the fiscal architecture of federal
systems that tax bases are co-occupied by both federal and lower-level governments. This
tax base co-occupation gives rise to vertical externalities between federal and lower-level
governments,2 which tend to leave equilibrium lower-level government taxes too high.
This is because each lower-level government ignores the harm it does others by raising
its tax rate, insofar as the induced contraction in the federal tax base leads to a reduction
in federal spending that harms other lower-level governments too. With horizontal and
vertical externalities pointing to opposite directions the level of equilibrium lower-level
government taxation will depend on the balance of these externalities.3
Another important feature of federal fiscal arrangements is equalization grants.4 The
principle underlying equalization grants is that the federal government has the respon-
sibility to ensure that each jurisdiction has adequate revenues to provide a minimum
level of public service without recourse to exceptionally high levels of taxation.5 The
1Contributions to the literature on horizontal externalities, among others, include Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986), Wildasin (1989), Hoyt (1991), Dahlby (1996), and Keen and Marc-
hand (1997).
2Contributions to this literature include Cassing and Hillman (1982), Flowers (1988), Johnson (1988),
Boadway and Keen (1996), Wrede (1996), Wrede (2000), Boadway, Marchand and Vigneault (1998),
Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002), and Dahlby and Wilson (2003). Keen (1998) surveys vertical tax exter-
nalities, while Wilson (1999) provides a thorough review of the tax competition literature.
3For an analysis of this see Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) who show that this balance depends on
the elasticities of the demand for capital and the supply of savings. More recently, this comparison
has been taken to commodity taxation with cross border shopping (Rizzo (forthcoming), and Devereux,
Lockwood and Redoano (2007)) and to imperfectly competitive commodity markets (Karakosta and
Kotsogiannis (2006)).
4There is a wide range of policy reforms suitable of internalizing fiscal externalities. For an early
discussion see Wildasin (1989). See also Dahlby (1994), and Bu¨ttner, Hauptmeier and Schwager (2006).
5Such grants is common practice in many, the structure of which typically differs between them,
countries. A system of equalization grants is a particular system of revenue sharing and is already
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typical equalization system sets the per capita transfer to each jurisdiction equal to the
difference between its fiscal capacity and the average fiscal capacity of the federation,
multiplied by a standard tax rate that is usually equal to the average of jurisdictions’
tax rates. The fiscal capacity of a jurisdiction is measured by the observed per capita
tax base of that jurisdiction. Hence, the equalization system aims to equalize difference
in tax revenues, but implements transfers through an indirect formula that is based on
differences in observed tax bases.
It is well understood that equalization grants distort fiscal policy incentives of the receiv-
ing jurisdictions and, thus, they have efficiency consequences for the level of lower-level
government taxation. The reason for this is that equalization grants compensate juris-
dictions for the adverse effect of an increased tax rate on their tax bases thereby inducing
them to raise taxes higher than it is desirable from a national point of view.6 To put it
somewhat differently, a tax increase by a single lower-level government causes an outflow
of tax base from that jurisdiction (and so a reduction in its tax revenues) and an in-
crease in the tax base of all other jurisdictions. But the reduction in the tax base of that
jurisdiction, relative to the average tax base of the federation, increases its entitlement
under an equalization formula. This additional increment in equalization entitlement
compensates the deviating jurisdictions for the adverse effect of the increased tax rate
on their tax base and induces them to set taxes higher than would be chosen by a social
planner.
An issue that has attracted attention recently is the extent to which an equalization grant
system of the type described above can exactly offset the horizontal fiscal externalities,
thereby making lower-level governments willing to implement the tax policies that would
be chosen by a unitary government. A contribution by Bucovetsky and Smart (2006)
has shown that it can. And this conclusion holds, with simple and intuitive adjustments
to the grant system, under a wide range of assumptions about the fundamentals of the
economy.
Though the contribution of Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) provides us with a number of
employed in a number of countries, including Canada, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. How these
grants are computed need not concern us here. For the analysis that follows it suffices to describe the
general principle underlying the definition of these grants. We turn to this in the next Section.
6The incentive affects are analyzed in, among others, Smart (1998), Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2002), and Bucov-
etsky and Smart (2006). Empirical evidence for the impact of equalization on the tax setting behavior
of lower level jurisdictions is provided by Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis (forthcoming), and Smart (forth-
coming) for Canada, Bu¨ttner (2006), and Bu¨ttner, Hauptmeier and Schwager (2006) for Germany.
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insights regarding the incentive effects of equalization grants, it pays no attention to the
fact that lower-level tax setting behavior creates also vertical fiscal externalities. This
is because the federal government does not have an active role but is introduced when
needed, as a deus ex machina, to derive the unitary level of lower-level government taxes.
In reality, however, federal governments do play an active role, both in financing and
administering equalization grant systems. Equalization grants typically do not involve
wealthy jurisdictions making payments to poor jurisdictions; rather, they are transfers
from the federal to the lower-level governments that make up the difference between
actual lower-level taxes or revenues and some measure of the highest, average, or repre-
sentative levels of the same taxes or revenues.7 Since these federal transfers are payments
(to the lower-level government) raised by distortionary taxes, they naturally come out
of the federal budget.8
A related, but distinctively different, contribution to the present is the one by Bu¨ttner,
Hauptmeier and Schwager (2006) who explore the conditions under which local grant
mechanisms enforced by the state governments will enhance efficiency of local taxation.
Like us, they do recognize the possibility that the fiscal equalization system impacts on
federal and lower-level governments through sharing of revenues, but unlike us they do
not model vertical fiscal externalities.
It is the recognition of this federal budget for the level of lower-level government taxation
that is central to this paper. More specifically, this paper by explicitly recognizing
that (a) lower-level government taxation causes vertical fiscal externalities, and (b) it is
the federal government’s responsibility to provide these equalization grants, with these
payments being paid from the use of distorting9 capital taxes asks: Can a equalization
grant system decentralize the unitary lower-level government taxes? and, if not, how does
this equalization grant formula need to be modified to account for the fiscal inefficiencies
7These transfers are, thus, distinctively different to those that make appearance in the literature that
discusses the issue of fiscal gap in federal economies. See, for instance, Boadway and Keen (1996), and
Kotsogiannis and Mart´ınez (2007).
8One, of course, may argue (as the existing literature implicitly does) that the required federal
revenues for the implementation of an equalization grant system can be raised from the lower-level
governments using lump sum taxation. This, however, raises the issue of why such lump sum taxation
is not available at the lower-level government level. If one accepts the usual arguments behind the
infeasibility (for both levels of government) of lump sum taxes then both levels of government must
raise revenues by distortionary means. It is the implication of the use of such taxes for the level of
lower-level government taxation that is the focus of this paper.
9The use of lump sum taxation for raising revenues for the implementation of the equalization grant
system is ruled out for the reason explained in footnote 8.
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that are present in the level of lower-level government taxation?
With respect to the first question, it is shown that the standard equalization grant system
does eliminate the two types of fiscal externalities identified above, except in the case
in which savings are responsive to taxation. If savings do respond to taxes, it is shown
that the standard equalization grant can be straightforwardly modified to account for
both the horizontal inefficiencies (as in Bucovetsky and Smart (2006)) and the vertical
ones; all it requires is that the equalization formula is modified by a factor that accounts
both for the sensitivity of demand for, and supply of, capital but also for the size of the
vertical externality.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a simple model of federal tax
arrangements, a central feature of which is that equalization grants are paid to jurisdic-
tions out of federal resources. Section 3 presents the results, while Section 4 concludes.
2 Description of the model
The structure of the model is similar to that of Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002); the
departure from that framework being in the explicit recognition of equalization grants
paid out of the federal budget.
The model features a federal economy that consists of m > 1 jurisdictions indexed by
i = 1 . . .m. In each jurisdiction i a competitive firm produces output using a strictly
concave technology fi(ki), with
10
f ′i(ki) > 0 > f
′′
i (ki) , (1)
where ki denotes capital employed in jurisdiction i.
11 The government of jurisdiction i
levies a source-based unit tax ti while the federal government levies a source-based unit
tax T , common to all jurisdictions. Consolidated capital tax in jurisdiction i is, then,
τi ≡ ti + T . Capital is costlessly and freely mobile across jurisdictions and so relocates
until it earns the same post-tax return ρ in each jurisdiction given by
f ′i(ki)− ti − T = ρ , (2)
10Derivatives of functions of one variable are indicated by primes.
11A second input, land, is fixed in supply and so it can be (and has been) suppressed.
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which implicitly defines ki(ρ+ τi) with
k′i(ρ+ τi) = 1/f
′′
i (ki) < 0 . (3)
Capital is paid its marginal product and so profits are given by12
πi(ki) = f(ki)− f
′
i(ki)ki , (4)
with, in particular, following from (3),
π′i(ρ+ τi) = −ki(ρ+ τi) . (5)
A citizen resides13 in each jurisdiction i and has quasilinear preferences defined over first-
and second-period private consumption, c1 and c2, the level gi of a local public good
provided by the local government in which they reside and the level G of the federal
public good. The resident in jurisdiction i has endowment e of first period income and
in the second period consumes the principal and interest on the first-period savings plus
the profits earned in their jurisdiction. Utility is then given by u(c1) + ci2 + Γi(gi, G),
where both u (·) and Γi (·) are strictly increasing and concave. Utility maximization gives
savings s (ρ), with s′ > 0, and indirect utility
U(ρ, τi) ≡ u(e− s(ρ)) + (1 + ρ)s(ρ) + πi(ρ+ τi) . (6)
It is also the case—following as an envelope property and (5), respectively—that
∂U
∂ρ
= s− ki ;
∂U
∂τi
= −ki < 0 . (7)
Denoting aggregate savings in the federation by S (ρ) = ms(ρ), equilibrium in the capital
market implies that
S(ρ) = Σiki(ρ+ τi) . (8)
Equation (8) implicitly defines ρ(~τ), where ~τ = (τ1, . . . , τm), with in particular
∂ρ
∂ti
=
k′i(ρ+ τi)
S ′(ρ)− Σjk′j(ρ+ τj)
∈ (−1, 0) , (9)
12Profits accrue, fully, to the households and are not taxable by the governments. An earlier version
of this paper has considered the possibility of resource taxation. Adding this to the present framework
is possible but it would add extra complications without adding further insights to the issue at the heart
of this analysis.
13The emphasis of this paper is not on the efficiency properties of lower-level government taxation
in the presence of equalization grants when there is heterogeneity of consumers within and across
jurisdictions. It is, therefore, assumed that only one consumer resides in each jurisdiction.
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and
∂ρ
∂τ
=
Σik
′
i(ρ+ τi)
S ′(ρ)− Σjk′j(ρ+ τj)
∈ (−1, 0) , (10)
and thus the return to savings is decreasing in the level of taxation, lower-level govern-
ment, federal and, hence, consolidated. Notice also, following from (3) and (8), (abusing
notation somewhat), that
∂ki
∂ti
= k′i(ρ+ τi)
(
1 +
∂ρ
∂ti
)
< 0, for all i , (11)
and
∂kj
∂ti
= k′j(ρ+ τj)
∂ρ
∂ti
> 0, for all j 6= i , (12)
and thus an increase in the tax of jurisdiction i reduces capital, following (11), in that
jurisdiction but increases capital, following (12), in jurisdiction j.
In this paper we are interested in the efficiency properties of a particular equalization
grant mechanism, hence the analysis will confine attention to an economy in which
consumers have identical preferences for the public good, in the sense that Γi(gi, G) =
Γ(g,G) for all i = 1 . . .m, firms have access to symmetric technologies fi = f for all
i = 1 . . .m, and so to a symmetric equilibrium τi = τ and gi = g, for all i = 1 . . .m.
Of course, in such an equilibrium no equalization payments are paid but their presence
does influence the tax setting behavior of the local governments, since a deviation by
any lower-level government from the optimal tax rate would be inducing a change in
equalization transfers. We turn to this shortly below.
It suffices, however, for the moment to notice, and for later use, that in such equilibrium
(9) and (10) become, respectively
∂ρ
∂ti
=
k′
m (s′ − k′)
∈ (−1, 0) , (13)
p′ (τ) =
k′
s′ − k′
∈ (−1, 0) , (14)
and so, upon making use (14), (13) becomes
∂ρ
∂ti
=
1
m
p′ . (15)
We turn now to a detailed description of a standard equalization mechanism and then
continue with the maximization problem faced by the lower-level governments.
7
2.1 Equalization grants and the federal government
As noted in the introductory Section, an equalization system is a particular from of
transfers. It sets the per capita transfer to each jurisdiction equal to the difference
between its capacity and the average fiscal capacity of the federation, multiplied by a
standard tax rate usually equal to the average of jurisdictions’ tax rates. Equalization
grant to jurisdiction i = 1 . . .m,14 denoted by ωi, is thus given by
15
ωi = t¯
(
k¯ − ki
)
, (16)
where
t¯ ≡
∑
i tiki∑
i ki
,
is the average lower-level government tax rate, and
k¯ ≡
∑
i ki
m
,
is the federal (‘national’) average tax base. Notice, something we turn to shortly, that
the cost to the federal government of the equalization grant system in (16) is given by
Σjωj.
As already noted, the departure of this paper from the existing contributions dealing with
the efficiency properties of equalization grants is in the incorporation of the possibility
that uncoordinated lower-level government tax behavior causes vertical tax inefficiencies.
The institutional set up considered here is one that considers the equalization grant
formula to be predetermined and any required equalization revenues paid out of the
federal budget:16 We do not, thus, consider why an equalization grant system has the
particular structure it has, but simply explore its consequences for the efficient level of
lower-level government taxation.
The federal government, given the predetermined equalization formula, taxes capital in
the federation, meets the required expenditure on the equalization grants, and distributes
14These grants are also called ‘full’ equalization grants. This is because if all receiving jurisdictions
do set the national average tax rates, then their revenues after equalization will indeed be equal.
15Notice that in (16), the equalization payments cannot be negative. If ωi < 0, because the fiscal
capacity in jurisdiction i exceeds that of the average fiscal capacity of the federation, in the sense that
k¯ − ki < 0, then in this case ωi = 0.
16Arguably, this is a realistic assumption. In most federations the equalization system is embedded in
the federal constitution, changes fairly infrequently and is rarely determined by the federal government
alone but it is the product of intensive negotiations between the levels of government.
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the residual federal revenues to the lower-level governments uniformly.17 This amounts
to per-jurisdiction spending
G =
1
m
(TΣjkj(ρ+ τj)− Σjωj(~τ)) , (17)
where in (17) we have explicitly denoted the dependence of ωj on the vector of taxes ~τ .
With respect to the type of the federal public good considered here two issues arise.
Firstly, it is conceivable that the expenditure on the equalization grants is larger than
the federal capital tax revenues that can be collected and as a consequence, for a positive
level of federal public good provision, some form of borrowing on the part of the federal
government will be required. Though this is, in general, a possibility in the equilibrium
analyzed such an issue will not arise since no actual equalization grants are paid to
the jurisdictions. Secondly, one may wonder why the federal government provides a
quasi-public good whose benefit is shared equally between the jurisdictions instead of
a pure public good that is, one whose benefit does not diminish with the number of
jurisdictions (as, for example, with expenditure on national defence). The reason for
this is analytical convenience. As will be shown later on, the main result of this paper
generalizes, straightforwardly, to the latter type of public good.
Notice also, for later use, following from (16), that
∂ωi
∂ti
=
∂t¯
∂ti
(
k¯ − ki
)
+ t¯
(
∂k¯
∂ti
−
∂ki
∂ti
)
. (18)
(18) simply states that an increase in ti affects equalization entitlements via two channels;
the first one is through the change in the average lower-level government tax rate (for
given fiscal capacities), while the second through the change in the fiscal capacities (for
given average lower-level government tax rate).
Before proceeding to the determination of the equilibrium lower-level government tax
rates, notice that in a symmetric equilibrium (18) becomes
∂ωi
∂ti
= −
(
m− 1
m
)
t¯k′ > 0 , (19)
and so jurisdiction i perceives that an increase in its tax rate increases the equalization
payment received by that jurisdiction (the inequality follows from equation (3)). This is
17Arguably, there are many federal public goods that fit this description, as, as for example, expen-
diture on highways or education.
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simply because jurisdiction i perceives its tax base to be more elastic than the average
tax base of the federation. To see this, first notice that, since the average tax base in the
federation k¯ is equal to the tax base in a typical jurisdiction ki, the first term in (18) is
zero. What is left, therefore, is the difference between two effects arising from the change
in ti; one relating to the change of the federation average tax base, ∂k¯/∂ti, and given, in
symmetric equilibrium, by k′ (1 + p′) /m < 0, and the other relating to the change in the
own tax base ∂ki/∂ti given, also in symmetric equilibrium, by k
′ (1 + (1/m) p′) < 0. Since
the change in federal average tax base is (in absolute terms) smaller than the (absolute
value of the) lower-level government one, jurisdiction i perceives that by changing ti
it will receive equalization payment equal to that given by equation (19). To put this
somewhat differently: The change in the average federation fiscal capacity due to the
change in the net price of capital is exactly offset by the average lower-level government
fiscal capacity in the sense that k′p′/m = k′(1/m)p′. What is left is the change in the
federation fiscal capacity due to ti and the lower-level government fiscal capacity due to
ti, that is k
′/m−k′. Multiplying the latter by −t¯ one arrives at the marginal equalization
grant in (19).
We turn now to the maximization problem of the typical jurisdiction i.
2.2 Maximization problem of a typical lower-level government
Public good in jurisdiction i is financed with revenues from two sources; taxation on
capital and equalization grants received by the federal government. Public good in
jurisdiction i is, therefore, given by
gi = tiki(ρ+ τi) + ωi(~τ) . (20)
Consider now the problem that the typical lower-level government i faces. It maximizes
welfare, given by
Wi(ρ, τi, gi, G) = U(ρ+ τi) + Γi(gi, G) , (21)
subject to (17) and (20),18 holding Nash conjectures against all other lower-level gov-
ernment taxes as well as the federal tax. This maximization problem, evaluated at a
symmetric equilibrium gives—after using (7), (8), (13) and (14), and the fact that in
such an equilibrium t¯ = t—the necessary condition
∂Wi (ti, T, ~τ)
∂ti
= −k + Γg
[
k + tk′
(
1 +
1
m
p′
)
+
∂ωi
∂ti
]
+ ΓG
1
m
Tk′ (1 + p′) = 0 . (22)
18The lower-level governments, thus, recognize the change in federal spending, in (17), due to their
tax setting behavior but the cost of their action is not accounted fully. See below.
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The first term in (22), −k, reflect the utility loss associated with a loss in second period
consumption due to the change in the price of capital.19 The terms involving Γg reflects
the utility impact of ti, through the change in the lower-level government tax revenues (an
impact that depends, of course, on the existence of the marginal equalization grant, given
by ∂ωi/∂ti). Finally, the term involving ΓG reflects the utility impact of ti through the
federal budget constraint. Notice that this latter term does not contain terms involving
equalization payments. This is because the change in the federation per capita tax base
due to the local tax ti is exactly offset by the change in all lower-level government tax
bases due to ti.
20 So a change in ti has no revenue impact (and so no vertical externalities)
on utility through equalization grants.
3 (In)efficiency of lower-level government taxes
To investigate the (in)efficient level of taxation at the lower-level of government write
aggregate welfare in a symmetric equilibrium as
W (t, T, τ) ≡ v [p (τ) , τ, tk (τ + p (τ)) , Tk (τ + p (τ))] , (23)
and differentiate with respect to the common t (and for given federal tax T ) to find,
after making use of (7) and the market equilibrium in (8),
∂W (t, T, τ)
∂t
= −k + Γg [k + tk
′ (1 + p′)] + ΓGTk
′ (1 + p′) . (24)
For the identification of the externalities, it is the sign of (24) that is of interest.21 One
perspective on the sign of (24) is given by comparing this with the necessary condition
of the typical government (excluding equalization grants) in (23) to find
∂W (t, T )
∂t
=
(
m− 1
m
)
[Γgtk
′p′ + ΓGTk
′(1 + p′)] . (25)
The term [(m− 1)/m]Γgtk
′p′ > 0 in (25) gives the horizontal externalities that relate to
the impact that jurisdiction i’s tax decision has on all other m − 1 jurisdictions: Each
jurisdiction ignores the benefit it confers on other jurisdictions by raising its tax rate and
so inducing outward movement of its tax base. This externality tends to leave local tax
19In such an equilibrium, following (7), s = k and so the terms of trade externality (familial from
DePater and Myers (1994)) does not make appearance.
20This claim is shown in the Appendix.
21Notice that (24) involves no equalization payments. This is because (24) involves perturbation in
the common t and thus all effects through equalization payments are accounted for.
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rates too low, from an equilibrium point of view. The term [(m− 1)/m]ΓGTk
′ (1 + p′) <
0 in (25) gives the vertical externality between federal and lower-level governments:
Each lower-level government ignores the harm it does on all other m − 1 jurisdictions
from the induced contraction of the common tax base caused by raising its tax rate.
This externality points towards lower-level government taxes that are too high, from an
equilibrium point of view. It is, thus, the case that horizontal and vertical externalities
point towards opposite directions and thus the level of equilibrium lower-level government
taxation will depend on the balance of these externalities.22
It is the externalities identified in the preceding paragraph that an efficient equalization
grant formula should internalize. Notice that as p′ → −1 (something that holds if,
following from (14), savings become inelastic in the sense that s′ → 0) then, following
from (25), the vertical externality ΓGTk
′(1 + p′) → 0 and so the federal tax base tends
to be unresponsive to lower-level government taxation.23 The reason for this is intuitive:
With inelastic savings there is no contraction of the federal tax base, given by Tk(p+τ) =
Ts(p), and hence no vertical externalities. In this case the marginal equalization grant
that implements the unitary optimum will not feature any vertical externalities. We
turn to this shortly.
One could also see equation (24)—with appropriately setting it equal to zero—as the first
order condition with respect to the appropriate choice of t1, . . . , tm where t1 = t2 . . . = tm,
of the social planner’s maximization problem (a social planner overseeing both levels of
government), conditional on the federal tax T . Seen that way, equation (24) implicitly
defines the unitary optimum for the lower-level governments, conditional on the federal
tax T . To make some progress on identifying whether the equalization grant formula in
(16) decentralizes the unitary outcome it is this perspective we now take.
Substituting equation (22), with equalization grants, into equation (24) (holding as
equality) one obtains the marginal equalization grant that internalizes both types of
externalities. This is given by
∂ωˆi
∂ti
=
(
m− 1
m
)
1
Γg
[
Γgtk
′p′ + ΓGTk
′(1 + p′)
]
. (26)
Inspection of (26) reveals (allowing for the limiting case p′ = −1) that if savings are
inelastic, then it readily reduces to the marginal equalization grant in (19). Consequently
22For an analysis of this balance see Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002).
23This would be the case in the canonical model of tax competition of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986).
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the equalization grant system in (16) can decentralize the unitary lower-level government
taxes. To emphasize this:
Proposition 1 In the presence of a federal government and with symmetric jurisdictions
and savings being inelastic, the unitary optimum can be decentralized with a system of
equalization grants that takes the form of that given in (16) that is, ωi = t¯
(
k¯ − ki
)
.
The result that the equalization grant system ωi = t¯
(
k¯ − ki
)
can decentralize the unitary
lower-level government taxes when savings are inelastic has not gone unnoticed,24 what
has gone unnoticed, however, is that it does so even in the presence of federal public
spending. The intuition behind this is straightforward. As already noted, with savings
being inelastic there is no contraction of the federal tax base and, hence, no vertical
externalities caused by lower-level government taxation. A deviation by any lower-level
government from the optimal tax rate then would induce a change in transfers that ex-
actly offsets the horizontal fiscal externality of such deviation given by [(m − 1)/m]tk′.
This implies that each lower-level government behaves as though its tax base were inde-
pendent of the tax rate.25
Seen differently, Proposition 1 also suggests that if savings are elastic, and so p′ 6= −1,
then the equalization grant in (16) will not replicate the unitary optimum, independently
of whether there is a federal government, and so vertical externalities, or not. The
reason for this is that the equalization grant system in (16) does not fully account for
the horizontal externalities and ignores completely the vertical ones.
With respect to the horizontal externalities, one can show that if savings are responsive to
its price the equalization grant system in (16) overcompensates lower-level governments
for the induced loss in the tax base due to an increase in the lower-level government
tax rates. To see this, suppose for the moment that there is no federal government and
so T = 0. Combining now equations (22) and (24), upon making use of the marginal
equalization in (19), one arrives at
∂W (t, T )
∂t
= [(m− 1)/m]Γgtk
′(1 + p′) < 0 . (27)
It is so the case that the unitary optimum level of taxes is lower that the non-cooperative
one, if savings are elastic, since a coordinated reduction in all lower-level government non-
24See, for instance, Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2002), and Bucovetsky and Smart (2006).
25Under any equalization grant system considered here public good provision provided by each lower-
level government in given by g = tk and, thus, there is full equalization of revenues.
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cooperative taxes increases welfare. To achieve second-best efficiency, in this case, it is
easy to verify, from (26), that the marginal equalization grant must satisfy
∂ωˆi
∂ti
= −p′
∂ωi
∂ti
, (28)
=
ed
ed + es
∂ωi
∂ti
, (29)
where the second equality follows from equation (14), with
ed ≡ −k
′/k > 0 ,
es ≡ s
′/s > 0 ,
denoting the semi-elasticities of demand and supply of capital, respectively. This con-
firms the result, for the symmetric case, of Bucovetsky and Smart (2006).
Since the vertical externalities that make appearance in the marginal equalization grant
in (26) also depend on the elasticity of savings, one might expect that they, too, can
be corrected with a similar adjustment in the equalization grant system in (16). This is
indeed the case, but here the adjustment is somewhat different and contains a measure
of the size of the vertical fiscal externality that needs to be corrected, given in utility
terms by [(m− 1)/m]ΓGTk
′(1 + p′), relative to the size (valued at the margin by Γg) of
the lower-level government public sector. This is required so the size of the vertical fiscal
externality, valued at the margin by ΓG, is incorporate into the lower-level government
budget constraint, the public good of which is valued by Γg. All in all, following from
(26), the vertical externality is corrected by a marginal equalization grant given by
∂ω˜i
∂ti
= −
(
m− 1
m
)
ΓGG
Γg
edes
ed + es
, (30)
=
∂ωi
∂ti
[
−
ΓGG
Γgg
es
ed + es
]
, (31)
where in equation (30) equations (14) and (17) have been used, whereas in (31) use of
equations (19) and (20) has been made. With (29) and (31) correcting for horizontal and
vertical inefficiencies at the lower-level of government taxation, respectively, it is clear
that the marginal equalization grant
ωˇi
∂ti
=
ωˆi
∂ti
+
ω˜i
∂ti
, (32)
= z
∂ωi
∂ti
, (33)
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where
z =
[
ed
ed + es
−
ΓGG
Γgg
es
ed + es
]
. (34)
decentralizes the unitary level of taxes at the lower-level of government. Consequently,
if lower-level governments face the equalization grant mechanism ωˇi = zωi, where ωi
is given by (16), then they would choose the unitary level of lower-level government
taxes. The intuition behind this is straightforward. A deviation by any lower-level
government from the optimal tax rate would induce a change in transfers that exactly
offsets the horizontal fiscal externality of such deviation, given by [(m − 1)/m]Γgtk
′p′,
and the vertical one, given by [(m − 1)/m]ΓGTs
′p′. This implies that each lower-level
government behaves as though its tax base, and that of the federation, were independent
of the tax rate. Summarizing:
Proposition 2 In the presence of vertical fiscal externalities, and with jurisdictions
being symmetric, the unitary optimum can be decentralized with a system of equalization
grants in the form of ωˇi ≡ z ωi where ωi is given by (16) and z is given by (34).
Proposition 2 offers a key result. It shows that in the presence of vertical fiscal exter-
nalities the popular equalization grant mechanism in (16) (that is, ωi = t¯
(
k¯ − ki
)
), once
adjusted by a factor that accounts for the elasticity of savings and the size of the vertical
fiscal externality, decentralizes the unitary level of lower-level government taxation.
Of course, the system of equalization grants of Proposition 2 requires a precise knowledge
of the marginal utilities of the public goods, in additional to information on the fiscal
capacities (and the elasticities of the supply of and demand) for capital required by
the equalization grant system that internalizes only the horizontal externalities (as of
that in Proposition 1). One may argue that such information requirement restricts
the implementation of such equalization mechanism, since such variables are private
information of the lower-level governments. While this might be true (and this is also true
for the equalization scheme in (16), that is based on fiscal capacities)26 what Proposition
2 also emphasizes is the direction of the adjustment of the equalization system in (16):
The equalization system should be adjusted positively so it corrects the horizontal fiscal
externalities and negatively so it corrects the vertical fiscal externalities.
26Even the determination of fiscal capacity is a difficult task. Recent work has started addressing the
consequences for electoral choices of the complexity of the equalization grant systems, Kotsogiannis and
Schwager (2006).
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Suppose now—to return to one of the issues regarding the federal public good raised in
section 2—that the federal public good is of the form
G = TΣjkj(ρ+ τj)− Σjωj(~τ) . (35)
Then, in this case, the first order condition of the typical government, evaluated at a
symmetric equilibrium—and after using (7), (8), (13) and (14)—becomes
∂Wi (ti, T, ~τ)
∂ti
= −k + Γg
[
k + tk′
(
1 +
1
m
p′
)
+
∂ωi
∂ti
]
+ ΓGTk
′ (1 + p′) = 0 . (36)
To investigate in this case the (in)efficient level of taxation at the lower-level of govern-
ment write aggregate welfare in a symmetric equilibrium as
W (t, T, τ) ≡ v [p (τ) , τ, tk (τ + p (τ)) ,mTk (τ + p (τ))] , (37)
and differentiate with respect to the common t (and for given federal tax T ) to find,
∂W (t, T, τ)
∂t
= −k + Γg [k + tk
′ (1 + p′)] + ΓGmTk
′ (1 + p′) . (38)
Substituting (36) into (38) gives
∂W
∂t
=
(
m− 1
m
)
Γgtk
′p′ + (m− 1)ΓGTk
′(1 + p′)− Γg
∂ωi
∂ti
. (39)
(39) reveals that the marginal transfer that decentralizes the unitary outcome (the trans-
fer that is, that sets ∂W/∂t = 0 in (39)) is given by
∂ωi
∂ti
=
1
Γg
[(
m− 1
m
)
Γgtk
′p′ + (m− 1)ΓGTk
′(1 + p′)
]
. (40)
The marginal equalization grant here, too, should internalize horizontal and vertical
externalities. The horizontal externality is the one identified previously, and still present
here in undiminished force. It is the vertical externality—arising again from the impact
that the lower-level government’s tax has of the federal tax base, an impact that is given
by (m − 1)Tk′(1 + p′)—that takes a new form. One, however, can straightforwardly
verify that the marginal equalization grant in (40) reduces to the same marginal transfer
of that given in Proposition 2. To emphasize:
Corollary 1 If the federal government provides a pure public good, and jurisdictions are
symmetric, then the unitary optimum can be decentralized with the system of equalization
grants of that given in Proposition 2.
It is, thus, the case that even if the federal government provides a pure public good the
popular equalization grant mechanism in (16) (that is, ωi = t¯
(
k¯ − ki
)
), once adjusted
by a factor that accounts for the elasticity of savings and the size of the vertical fiscal
externality, decentralizes the unitary level of lower-level government taxation.
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4 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this paper has not been to develop a complete theory of equalization
grants that corrects fiscal externalities in federal economies. Its purpose has been to
point out that in genuine federal systems—where horizontal fiscal externalities (that
arise because of uncoordinated behavior of lower-level governments) work alongside ver-
tical ones (that arise because lower-level government ignore the cost of their action on the
federal budget constraint)—a standard equalization grant system, that is based on equal-
izing tax revenues by observing fiscal capacity, works well in delivering the decentralized
level of lower-level government taxes, once it is appropriately adjusted.
The analysis is in many respects incomplete. The roles of technology and population
heterogeneity (eloquently analyzed by Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) for the case of
horizontal externalities only) have not been investigated. Intuition, however, suggests
that the present results (with the additional use of lump-sum transfers) will go through
once the trade-off between equity and efficiency is accounted for.
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Appendix
Proof of claim that the effect of ti has no effect on federal expenditure on
equalization grants that is, Σj∂ωj/∂ti = 0.
Take ∑
j
ωj =
∑
j
t¯
(
k¯ − kj
)
, (A.1)
which upon differentiation, with respect to ti, becomes
∑
j
∂ωj
∂ti
=
{
∂t¯
∂ti
(
k¯ − ki
)
+ t¯
(
∂k¯
∂ti
−
∂ki
∂ti
)}
+
∑
j 6=i
{
∂t¯
∂ti
(
k¯ − kj
)
+ t¯
(
∂k¯
∂ti
−
∂kj
∂ti
)}
.
(A.2)
Take now the average fiscal capacity of the federation defined in text to be
k¯ =
∑
ki
m
. (A.3)
Differentiating (A.3) with respect to ti one obtains
∂k¯
∂ti
=
k′i
(
1 + ∂ρ
∂ti
)
+
∑
j 6=i k
′
j
∂ρ
∂ti
m
, (A.4)
which upon evaluation at the symmetric equilibrium, using (13) and (14), becomes
∂k¯
∂ti
=
k′ (1 + p′)
m
. (A.5)
In a symmetric equilibrium k¯ = ki for all i = 1, . . .m, and thus ∂t¯/∂ti
(
k¯ − ki
)
= 0. It is
thus the case that (A.2) becomes
∑
j
∂ωj
∂ti
= t¯
∑
j
(
∂k¯
∂ti
−
∂kj
∂ti
)
, (A.6)
= t¯
{
k′i
(
1 +
∂ρ
∂ti
)
+
∑
j 6=i
k′j
∂ρ
∂ti
− k′i
(
1 +
∂ρ
∂ti
)
−
∑
j 6=i
k′j
∂ρ
∂ti
}
, (A.7)
= t¯ · 0 . (A.8)
where the second equality follows from (A.4) and (12), whereas the third equality follows
upon evaluating (A.7) at the symmetric equilibrium. 
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